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Abstract  
We study the impact of fuel taxes and kilometer taxes on households’ choices of 
vehicle quality, on their demand for kilometers driven, and on fuel consumption. Moreover, 
embedding this information in a model of the car market, we analyze the implications of these 
taxes for the opportunity costs of owning cars of different quality. Higher quality raises the 
fixed cost of car ownership, but it may raise (engine size, acceleration speed, etc.) or reduce 
(fuel technology, etc.) the variable user cost. Our results show that kilometer charges and fuel 
taxes have very different implications. For example, a higher fuel tax raises household 
demand for more fuel efficient cars, provided that the demand for car use is inelastic; it 
reduces the demand for characteristics that raise variable user costs. Surprisingly, however, a 
kilometer tax unambiguously reduces the demand for more fuel efficient cars. Incorporating 
price adjustments at the market level, we find that fuel taxes raise the marginal fixed 
opportunity cost of better fuel efficiency at all quality levels. Total annual opportunity costs of 
owning highly fuel efficient cars increase, while they decline for cars of low fuel efficiency. 
We further find that both a fuel tax and a kilometer charge reduce the total annual fixed 
ownership cost for car attributes that raise the variable cost of driving (engine power, 
acceleration speed, etc.). There is thus in general a trade-off between fixed and variable car 
costs: if the latter increase – due to higher fuel prices or a kilometer charge – total demand for 
cars decreases and a return to equilibrium is only possible by a decrease in fixed costs. All 
theoretical results are illustrated using a numerical version of the model. The analysis shows 
that modeling the effect of tax changes on household behavior alone can produce highly 
misleading results.  
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1. Introduction 
Many countries are revising their fiscal treatment of transport services to cope with the 
negative side-effects of road transportation. To tackle congestion and pollution, a variety of 
tax and pricing instruments have been considered in the academic literature. For example, 
congestion pricing has been extensively studied by Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1993), 
Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996), De Borger and Proost (2001), Parry and Bento (2001), 
and Van Dender (2003). The introduction of kilometer charges on freight transport was 
studied in Calthrop, De Borger and Proost (2007). The use of emission taxes, kilometer 
charges, and subsidies to fuel efficient vehicles was analyzed in, among others, Fullerton and 
West (2002), Fullerton and Gan (2005), and Fischer, Harrington and Parry (2007). The role of 
fuel taxes in coping with transport externalities has been investigated by Parry and Small 
(2005) and Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen and Von Haefen (2009). 
In this paper we study, using both theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, the 
effect of different tax instruments on households’ demand for quality characteristics of cars. 
We further analyze how these demand shifts -- through price adjustments on the car market – 
affect the annual opportunity cost of owning cars of different quality.  Unlike the discrete 
choice literature, we assume that observable quality attributes can be selected continuously 
within a certain range of available qualities (for example, engine power, fuel efficiency, 
‘newness’, etc.).1 This allows us to study the effect of marginal increases in different taxes on 
the demand for different types of quality characteristics of cars. We distinguish between two 
prototypes of car quality. The first one refers to better fuel technology that increases fuel 
efficiency per se. As cars of higher fuel efficiency are more expensive, ceteris paribus, 
owning a more fuel efficient car raises the annual fixed ownership cost, but lower fuel use 
decreases the variable user cost. The second type includes car characteristics that make 
driving more comfortable, while decreasing fuel efficiency. They usually increase both fixed 
and variable cost. Examples are size, acceleration speed, weight, engine power, etc. For the 
first type of quality the trade-off is between fixed and variable cost, while for the second type 
                                                            
1 In a discrete choice setting in which cars are also differentiated in unobserved (make-specific) aspects, any 
switch to a different car type implies a shift to another value of the unobserved quality characteristic. However, 
in a theoretical setting an exclusive focus on observable quality seems quite justified. Almost all car brands offer 
the possibility to buy slightly different versions of the same model, and the catalogue of possible combinations 
of characteristics is often large, approaching a situation in which slightly different values of one or a few 
characteristics can be chosen while keeping all others constant. Note that, apart from being more realistic in such 
cases, our approach avoids some peculiar and unattractive properties discrete choice models of the commonly 
used Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) type can have. See, for instance, the discussions in Berry and Pakes 
(2007) and Bajari and Benkard (2003).   
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the impact of better quality on the utility of driving must compensate for the higher fixed as 
well as variable cost.  
Within this framework, the paper studies the impact of fuel taxes, kilometer taxes and 
taxes on car ownership on households’ choices of vehicle quality, on their demand for 
kilometers driven, and on fuel consumption. Moreover, we investigate the impact of variable 
user taxes (fuel taxes, kilometer taxes) on the annual opportunity cost of owning various types 
of cars. The recent empirical literature convincingly argues that higher fuel prices raise the 
demand for high fuel economy vehicles, pushing up their relative prices (see, e.g., Klier and 
Linn (2009), Allcott and Wozny (2010)). These price adjustments suggest that the annual 
fixed opportunity cost of owning a car with given quality characteristics does depend on 
variable user taxes. 2 To study the effect of fuel and kilometer taxes on fixed ownership costs 
we embed the model of individual consumer behavior in a simple model for the car market. 
This allows us to model the adjustments in fixed annual ownership cost of cars of different 
quality that re-establish market equilibrium after a tax increase. As new car demand and 
scrappage of old cars constitute a small fraction of the car stock – and in line with recent 
empirical evidence -- our focus is on price adjustments on the second hand car market, where 
total supply is close to fixed in the short run.3   
Of course, a substantial economic literature exists on modeling households’ car 
ownership and car use decisions and on the implications of various types of transport tax 
reform. A large empirical discrete choice literature studies households’ car ownership choices 
(including the type of car to own) and the associated demand for car kilometres. Early 
contributions include, among many others, Mannering and Winston (1985), Train (1986) and 
De Jong (1990). More recently, various authors have exploited advances in econometric 
methodologies to estimate more detailed empirical models of car ownership and car use, and 
used the results to shed some light on specific policy issues. For example, Hausman and 
Newey (1995), West (2004) and West and Williamson (2005) focus on the efficiency and 
                                                            
2 Klier and Linn (2009) find that higher gas prices drives up prices of high fuel efficient vehicles. Demand 
responses are significant; the authors argue that nearly half of the decline in market share of U.S. manufacturers 
from 2002-2007 was due to the increase in the price of gasoline. Increases in the gasoline tax were found to have 
remarkably modest effects on average fuel economy of new cars. In line with intuition, changes in market share 
of cars of high fuel efficiency, due to increased production of such vehicles and scrappage of low fuel economy 
vehicles, attenuate price  changes (Li, Timmins, and Von Haefen (2009), and Allcott and Wozny (2010)).  
3 For example, Busse, Knittel and Zettelmayer (2009) find that the adjustment of equilibrium market shares and 
prices in response to changes in usage cost varies dramatically between new and used markets. In the new car 
market, the adjustment is primarily in market shares, while in the used car market, the adjustment is primarily in 
prices. They explain the difference in how gasoline costs affect new and used automobile markets by differences 
in the supply characteristics of new and used cars. 
3 
 
distributive effects of gasoline taxes. In two related papers, Fullerton and Gan (2005) and 
Feng, Fullerton and Gan (2005) specify a model in which people choose first among large 
vehicle categories (small van, small regular car, etc), and then choose kilometres and age of 
the vehicle simultaneously, where fuel efficiency depends on age. To keep a linear budget 
constraint they transform age into ‘wear’ using a constant depreciation rate. The estimated 
empirical models are used to study the relative efficiency of different emission reduction 
policies such as an emission tax, a fuel tax, changes in annual registration fees, etc. A recent 
paper by Bento et al. (2009) incorporates the supply side of the car market into an analysis 
that distinguishes the market for new, used and scrapped vehicles; they reconsider the 
distributional effects of fuel taxes, distinguishing 256 types of cars. Finally, a number of 
papers have developed numerical simulation models to analyze the implications of taxing car 
use and/or car ownership. For example, Chia, Tsui and Whalley (2001) analyze the relative 
efficiency of taxes on car ownership and taxes on car use showing, not surprisingly, that the 
latter are more efficient to control externalities. Parry and Small (2005) construct a detailed 
simulation model to numerically evaluate the relative optimality of fuel taxes in the US and 
the UK. Recently, De Borger and Mayeres (2007) study the optimal taxation of the ownership 
and use of different types of cars, focusing on taxation of cars operating on different fuels 
(diesel and gasoline) 4.  
Our findings in this paper show that kilometer charges and fuel taxes have very 
different implications, both for the demand for quality and for price adjustments on the car 
market. First, consider the demand for car attributes that improve fuel efficiency (say, better 
fuel technology). As expected, an increase in the fuel tax induces households to choose cars of 
better fuel efficiency, at least provided that the demand for car use is inelastic. Surprisingly, a 
higher kilometer tax reduces the demand for fuel efficiency. A general increase in fixed taxes 
on car ownership reduces the demand for better fuel technology although, obviously, lower 
marginal tax rates on more fuel efficient cars raise demand for better fuel technology. Second, 
looking at quality characteristics that raise variable user costs (engine size, acceleration 
speed,…), we show that higher fuel taxes plausibly induce households to demand cars of 
lower quality, whereas the effect of higher kilometer taxes is ambiguous. Higher non-
                                                            
4 The model studied in this paper is also related to two other strands of recent literature. One is the literature on 
aggregate but separate effects of policy parameters on the vehicle stock, fuel efficiency and energy use 
(Johansson and Schipper (1997), Small and Van Dender (2007)). Another link is to the literature on multiple 
discreteness, that has recently received substantial attention. See, in particular, Bhat (2005, 2008). These models 
were originally developed to deal with consumers who use varying amounts of different types of nondurable 
consumption goods, or participate in various activities for time spells of varying length; however, there have also 
been some applications to automobile demand (see, e.g., Bhat and Sen (2006) and Bhat (2008)). 
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differentiated fixed taxes raise the demand for such quality attributes. Third, different demand 
impulses of fuel taxes and kilometer charges also imply different adjustments on the car 
market. We find that fuel taxes raise the annual opportunity costs of owning very fuel 
efficient cars, while reducing ownership costs of cars of low fuel efficiency. The marginal 
fixed cost of better fuel efficiency on the market rises at all quality levels, but mostly so for 
the most fuel efficient cars. Both a fuel tax and a kilometer charge reduce the annual fixed 
ownership cost for car attributes that raise the variable cost of driving (engine power, 
acceleration speed, etc.). This holds at all quality levels.  
Of course, this paper has a number of limitations. The model we develop considers the 
effects of taxes on the demand side of the market only. Like most other models (Bento et al. 
(2009) being an obvious exception) we ignore the supply side of the car market, assuming 
supply is fixed in the short-run. Moreover, unlike a discrete choice approach, our model is 
deterministic; it does not introduce randomness in preferences for unobserved characteristics 
to generate car ownership decisions. In the numerical simulations below, we use differences 
in income to generate differences in demand among households. Finally, note that we focus 
on illustrating the effects of taxes on household decisions; we neither attempt to design an 
optimal tax system, nor do we concentrate on the overall welfare effects of marginal tax 
changes.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we develop a model of household 
choice of car quality and demand for kilometres, and we analyse the impact of different 
variable user taxes and fixed ownership taxes on household behaviour. Since tax changes 
affect the car ownership decision as well as the choice of car quality, they affect the 
equilibrium on the car market. In section 3 we therefore embed the choice model into a simple 
model of the car market. We use this model to investigate the changes in annual fixed 
ownership costs necessary to re-establish market equilibrium after a change in the fuel tax or 
the kilometre charge. Section 4 illustrates the theoretical findings using a numerical version of 
the model. In Section 5 we discuss extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Taxes and the demand for car quality attributes 
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model of individual household 
behavior. Although the car ownership decision is considered towards the end of this section, 
the main purpose of the model is to study the impact of various transport taxes on households’ 
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choice of car quality attributes and on their demand for car use, conditional on car ownership5. 
We are specifically interested in the differential effects of fuel taxes and kilometer taxes on 
fuel efficiency and on the demand for kilometers (and, hence, on overall fuel consumption). 
Car attributes are summarized into two general quality characteristics that have very different 
implications for cars’ fuel efficiency and for overall energy us 
e6. The first one is a technological attribute k that improves fuel efficiency (call it ‘fuel 
technology’), but it does not directly affect the utility of driving. The second one is a quality 
attribute m that does affect the utility of driving (engine size, engine power, car size, 
acceleration speed, etc.), but it raises fuel consumption and, hence, the variable cost per 
kilometer. Both characteristics also raise the fixed annual cost of car ownership, see below.  
 
2.1. Structure of the model 
We assume the consumer’s choice of car quality characteristics and the number of 
kilometers to drive can be seen as the result of the following problem:  
max௫,௤,௞,௠ ݑሺݔ, ݍ; ݉ሻ    ݏ. ݐ.      ݔ ൅ ሾ݂ሺ݇, ݉ሻ ൅ ݐሺ݇, ݉ሻሿ ൅ ሾ݌ሺߨ, ݇. ݉ሻ ൅ ߬ሿݍ ൌ ݕ 
In this formulation, x is a general consumption good, q is kilometers driven by car, and k and 
m are the quality attributes described above; finally, y is exogenous income. The fixed annual 
cost of the car consists of the net-of-tax cost ( , )f k m plus the annual ownership tax payments
( , )t k m . It is realistically assumed that both quality attributes raise the annual fixed cost: better 
quality cars are more expensive, and it is assumed that spreading this increase over the 
lifetime of the car is not fully compensated by, for example, lower annual maintenance costs.  
We specifically assume the fixed cost is increasing in quality at an increasing rate: 
2 2
2 2
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )0; 0; 0; 0f k m f k m f k m f k m
k m k m
           
Note that, although the relative prices of different cars with different quality characteristics 
will respond to changes in taxes due to aggregate demand effects, in the short-run consumers 
treat the fixed ownership cost as exogenously given. The relation of the fixed annual tax 
payments t(.) and the quality indicators is left unspecified for the time being, see below. The 
                                                            
5 We limit the discussion to households that have decided to own a single car. Extending the model to allow for 
multiple car ownership is conceptually straightforward, but it does substantially complicate the technical 
analysis. Apart from the potential effect of transport taxes on the relative intensity of using different cars 
(substitution between cars within the household), assuming multiple household car does not yield major 
additional insights in the topic we study in this paper. For information on empirical analyses of substitution 
between cars in the household, see De Borger, Mulalic and Rouwendal (2012)).   
6 Again, it is not difficult to generalize the model to more quality characteristics, but for the topic of this paper 
nothing is gained by doing so.  
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variable price per kilometer ( , , )p k m gives the cost per kilometer as a function of the fuel 
price   (inclusive of fuel tax) and the quality indicators. As our focus will be on fuel 
efficiency and fuel use, we specify the variable cost as 
 ( , ) ( , )( , , ) ( , ); 0; 0e k m e k mp k m e k m
k m
        
In other words, the variable cost is the fuel price ߨ (inclusive of tax) times fuel use e(k,m) per 
kilometer. The function e(k,m) reflects the inverse of fuel efficiency; it declines in the fuel 
technology characteristic k, and rises in the quality characteristic m. Finally, as argued above, 
the government has the possibility to introduce a kilometer tax, denoted  .  
 
2.2. Taxes and the demand for car quality attributes 
 In this section, we study the impact of taxes on the demand for the two quality 
characteristics defined above. For pedagogic reasons, it will be useful to deal with the two 
quality attributes separately7.   
2.2.1. Taxes and the demand for fuel-saving technology  
Let us first focus on the effect of various taxes on the consumer’s optimal demand for 
better fuel technology, as captured by k. In other words, we hold m constant and, for 
notational convenience, drop it from the analysis that follows.  
Consider first the individual’s choice of kilometers driven for a car with given fuel 
technology k:  
 
,
( , ) . . ( ) ( ) ( )
x q
Max u x q s t x e k q y f k t k       
This leads to the ‘short-run’ demand function for car use 
  ( ) ( ), ( )SRq q y f k t k e k      
Indirect utility, for a given quality k, is written as: 
 ( ) ( ), ( )SRv v y f k t k e k      
Next, optimal quality choice is found by maximizing indirect utility with respect to k. We 
have the first-order condition (the second-order condition requires 
2
2 0
v
k
  ): 
                                                            
7 The effect of the various taxes on both car characteristics jointly is considered in an unpublished appendix 
available from the authors. It does not affect the results described in this section; the sequential treatment offered 
here is more transparent, however.   
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 0v f t v e
y k k p k
                      (1) 
This condition holds at the optimal quality k*. Using Roy’s theorem and rearranging, we find 
that (1) relates equilibrium demand at optimal quality to the effects of quality on fixed and 
variable costs as follows: 
  ( *) ( *), ( *)
f t
k kq y f k t k e k e
k
 

       

     (2) 
Interestingly, expression (2) implies a strong relationship between optimal demand for 
kilometers (on the left-hand side) and the technical relations that determine how quality 
affects the fixed and variable costs. 
 To analyze the effect of various taxes on optimal quality choice and optimal car use, 
we rewrite (2) and define kZ as follows 
   ( *) ( *), ( *) 0k e f tZ q y f k t k e k k k k  
               
   (3) 
The implicit function theorem then yields the effects of fuel and kilometer taxes on optimal 
quality choices: 
* 1 ( )
* 1
k
kk kk
k
kk kk
Zdk e qq e k
d Z Z k p
Zdk e q
d Z Z k p




            
         
 
 
    (4) 
Here krZ denotes the derivative of kZ with respect to r. It is easy to verify that the second-
order condition of the consumer’s optimization problem implies  0kkZ  .  
The implications are clear. Since ( ) 0e k
k
  , a sufficient condition for a higher fuel tax 
to induce people to choose a car of better fuel technology is that the demand for car 
kilometers is inelastic. In choosing optimal fuel efficiency, consumers trade off the marginal 
benefits associated with lower variable costs versus the higher fixed cost of buying and 
owning a more fuel efficient car. At higher fuel prices, the marginal benefit of better fuel 
efficiency is affected while the marginal cost remains unchanged. The effect of fuel prices on 
the marginal benefit of better fuel efficiency has two dimensions. For a given number of 
kilometers, the marginal benefit of a more fuel efficient car rises when the fuel tax rises. 
However, the higher price per kilometer reduces demand, and this reduces the marginal 
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benefit of a more fuel efficient car. Inelastic demand implies the first effect dominates and the 
consumer buys a more fuel efficient car. If demand is elastic, the decline in demand makes a 
more fuel efficient car less beneficial, and the fuel tax actually reduces fuel efficiency.  
Next, consider the effect of a kilometer tax on fuel technology choices. Expression (4) 
implies that this effect is unambiguously negative: introducing kilometer taxes leads people to 
opt for less fuel efficient cars. The reason is that a kilometer tax reduces the demand for 
kilometers, making the marginal benefit of better fuel efficiency smaller while not affecting 
the fixed ownership cost increase to obtain better fuel technology. 
 Of course, we can also consider the effect of changes in fixed annual car taxes on 
quality choices and on demand for kilometers. To do so, it seems instructive to specify the 
fixed tax function more explicitly. Suppose we have a simple linear fixed tax structure that 
allows for the possibility to impose lower fixed taxes on more fuel efficient cars: 
0( ) kt k t t k   
We find the following effects of the tax function parameters on quality: 
0
0
* 1 0
* 1 0k
kt
kk kk
kt
k kk kk
Zdk e q
dt Z Z k y
Zdk e q k
dt Z Z k y


          
         
 
A higher general fixed tax 0t  reduces the quality of fuel technology and hence fuel efficiency. 
The reason is that, provided income effects are nonzero, the tax increase reduces the demand 
for kilometers; this makes the benefit of better fuel efficiency less important. A specific tax 
reduction for more fuel efficient vehicles leads to better fuel efficiency choices.  
 We summarize our findings so far in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Consider a quality characteristic of cars that increases fuel efficiency and 
hence reduces variable user costs per kilometer (say, fuel technology).  
a. Introducing kilometer taxes unambiguously reduces the demand for fuel efficiency.  
b. If demand for car use is inelastic, higher fuel taxes imply that households demand 
more fuel efficient cars.  
c. A general increase in fixed taxes on car ownership reduces the demand for better 
fuel technology. Lower marginal tax rates on more fuel efficient cars raise demand 
for better fuel technology.   
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Two remarks conclude this section. First, qualitatively similar results are expected to hold 
for other quality indicators, such as ‘newness’ (i.e., the inverse of age), that also reduce the 
variable cost via lower fuel consumption and lower maintenance costs. The only difference is 
that, unlike a technological characteristic that raises fuel efficiency, newness does yield 
intrinsic utility for the typical consumer. However, as long as taxes not too strongly affect the 
marginal utility of driving in a newer car, we find qualitatively the same effects as in the case 
of pure fuel efficiency. So higher fuel taxes plausibly raise demand for newer cars, kilometer 
charges lead to more demand for older cars. Second, as repeatedly mentioned before, shifts in 
the demand for quality are likely to lead to price adjustments at the market level (these are 
studied in Section 3 below). However, if the supply of quality were perfectly elastic so that 
higher demand for quality could be obtained without affecting the fixed opportunity cost of 
owning a better car, Proposition 1 can be used to show the existence of rebound effects on 
demand. When the fuel tax increases, the direct negative effect on demand is partially 
counteracted by the impact the tax increase has on better fuel efficiency; the latter raises 
demand (see, for example, Small and Van Dender (2007) for an aggregate model of the 
rebound effect). A higher kilometer charge in fact generates an ‘inverse rebound’ effect: the 
direct demand effect of a kilometer charge is strengthened by the lower demand for fuel 
efficiency; this raises variable user cost and further reduces demand.8   
 
2.2.2 Taxes and the demand for quality attributes that raise variable unit costs 
The analysis for the quality characteristic m (for instance, weight, size, engine power, 
or acceleration speed) is to a large extent analogous to what we did in section 2.2.1, but there 
are a few important differences that we will emphasize. The characteristic m does yield 
intrinsic utility; moreover, it raises the variable cost per kilometer as well as the fixed annual 
ownership cost. We have ( ); 0ep e m
m
   .  
Following the same steps as before, we now obtain the following first-order condition 
with respect to quality  
                                                            
8 These results easily follow from defining demand at optimal quality  ( *) ( *), ( *) ,q q y f k t k e k      
differentiating with respect to the fuel tax, and using the results of Proposition 1.  
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 0v f t v e v
y m m p m m
                         (5) 
As both the first and second terms are negative, the pleasure of owning and using a better car 
must yield sufficient extra intrinsic utility: v
m

 >0. Using Roy’s theorem we find, following 
the same steps as above (notation is analogous to what we used before): 
 ( *) ( *), ( *) , * 0;m
v
e f t mZ q y f m t m e m m B B vm m m
y
  

                 

  (6) 
In (6), B is the intrinsic (i.e., holding kilometers constant) willingness to pay for extra quality.   
We find the following effects of fuel and kilometer taxes on optimal quality choices: 
 
 
* 1 ( )
* 1
m
mm mm
m
mm mm
Zdm e q Bq e m
d Z Z m p
Zdm e q B
d Z Z m p


 
 
               
             
   (7) 
In these expressions 
2 2
2
v v v v
B y m m y
v
y
 

                
2 2
2
v v v v
B y m m y
v
y
 

             
 
Consider the effect of the fuel tax. As more quality raises fuel use per kilometer (and 
we again have 0mmZ  by the second-order conditions), a sufficient condition for the first 
term between the square brackets on the right hand side of (7) to be positive is that demand 
for kilometers is less than unitary elastic. Moreover, as it probably feels better to have a large 
or powerful car when fuel prices are low, we may speculate that B

 <0. If this is the case, it 
follows from (7) that a fuel tax increase reduces a quality indicator m that raises the variable 
cost.  
Next, consider the effect of a kilometer tax on quality as defined here. The first term 
between brackets in the relevant equation of (7) is now negative. Unless the effect of the 
kilometer tax on the intrinsic value of a larger or more powerful car is largely negative ( B


<0 and large in absolute value), a higher kilometer tax raises quality. In that case, people drive 
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less because of the tax increase, but they do so in a better car. If the impact on the intrinsic 
value of better quality is largely negative, however, the opposite may hold.  
Consider again a linear fixed tax structure:  
0( ) mt m t t m   
We can think of the tax slope parameter mt  as reflecting a higher fixed ownership tax on 
larger size or engine power. We find the following effects of the tax function parameters on 
quality: 
0
0 0
* 1
* 1m
mt
mm mm
mt
m mm mm m
Zdm e q B
dt Z Z m y t
Zdm e q Bm
dt Z Z m y t


            
            
 
The fixed tax effects operate through two channels here. First, higher fixed taxes reduce net 
disposable income which reduces the demand for kilometers. This leads consumers to have 
higher demand for better quality cars; the better quality raises the variable price which 
reduces kilometer demand further. People opt for better cars driving fewer kilometers. 
Second, taxes affect the intrinsic willingness to pay for better quality. If the former effects 
dominate then higher fixed taxes (both 0 , mt t ) raise quality indicators such as engine size that 
raise the variable price. Note that these effects hold, conditional on ownership. Fixed taxes do 
reduce the demand for car ownership, see below.   
 Summarizing, we have Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: Consider quality characteristics of cars that raise variable user costs (engine 
size, acceleration speed,…).  
a. Higher fuel taxes then plausibly reduce households’ demand for quality 
b. The effect of higher kilometer taxes is ambiguous; it depends on how the tax affects 
intrinsic utility of having a better car.  
c. Higher fixed taxes raise the demand for quality.    
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2.3. The ownership decision 
We model car ownership decisions in the simplest possible way. First, we assume that 
people not owning a car are public transport users. Denoting the public transport fare by PTp
and its quality by PTm (this is intrinsic quality valued by the user), the demand for public 
transport – conditional on not owning a car -- follows from standard utility maximizing 
behavior. It results in indirect utility ݒ௉் ൌ ݒሺݕ, ݌௣௧, ݉௣௧ሻ.  
In the long-run, the consumer will use public transport if this yields higher utility than 
owning a car of optimal quality9. This condition can be written as  
  
,
( , , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ), ( , , ) ,PT PT PT LR SR
k m
v y p m v y Max v y f k m t k m p k m m       
The left-hand side is the utility of using public transport, given the fare and service quality 
provided by the operator. The right-hand side can be interpreted as the long run indirect utility 
of owning a car; we will denote this in shorthand notation as ݒ௅ோሺݕሻ. 
 Provided that the utilities of public transport and car use satisfy a single crossing 
condition 
  ( , , ) ( )
PT PT PT LRv y p m v y
y y
    
the solution of the above equation gives the critical income ݕ௖ such that all individuals with 
higher incomes than cy are car owners, whereas all people with lower incomes use public 
transport. Note that this setup assumes, consistent with empirical evidence, that car ownership 
rises with income. Importantly, since taxes increase the cost of driving, this critical income is 
an increasing function of all tax parameters. 
 
3. Taxes and equilibrium on the car market 
In the previous section, we presented a simple model to analyze the implications of 
changes in taxes on car use and car ownership on households’ choices of car quality 
characteristics and demand for kilometers. The model realistically assumed that from the 
viewpoint of the individual household, the annual fixed ownership cost function was fixed. Of 
course, changes in individual demands of households for cars of different qualities may lead 
to price adjustments at the market level. In the short-run, the total car stock cannot 
substantially adapt to the pressures of higher user taxes (as new car sales and scrappages are a 
                                                            
9 Technically, the individual has selected the optimal values of both quality characteristics k and m. 
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very small part of the total car market) and there is a distortion to the original equilibrium. 
Consequently, fuel prices and kilometer charges will lead to changes in the prices of cars on 
the second-hand market and, hence, to changes in the annual opportunity cost of owning 
different types of cars. As noted in the introduction, there is strong empirical evidence that 
rising fuel prices affect prices of cars of different fuel efficiency on the second-hand car 
market so as to re-establish market equilibrium (see Busse et al. (2009)). Some car types will 
become more expensive, others cheaper. 
To study these processes, in this section we embed the model of individual consumer 
behavior developed in Section 2 in a simple model of the car market. We assume that the car 
stock is currently allocated to a population of heterogeneous consumers that differ only in 
income y. Moreover, the model assumes the car stock is unaffected by the tax changes. As 
observed before, although the tax changes possibly affect the demand for new cars and the 
scrappage of old cars, these changes have such a small impact on the total car stock that we 
treat it as negligible. Within this simple framework our interest is to find the fixed opportunity 
cost function f(.)  that equilibrates demand for cars of all kinds of qualities with the existing 
stock, and to analyze how this function adjusts after a change in taxes so as to re-establish 
market equilibrium. For what follows, we need the assumption that car kilometers are a 
normal good. We further assume that fuel efficiency and the ownership tax are convex in k 
and m. As in the previous section, for pedagogic reasons we assume initially that cars differ 
only in one-dimensional quality (k or m).10 
 
3.1 Fuel saving technology k 
To get started, the income distribution is denoted ܩሺݕሻ, and the car stock is described 
by a distribution function ܪሺ݇ሻ. Incomes and car qualities belong to closed intervals ܻ ൌ
ൣݕ௠௜௡, ݕ௠௔௫൧  and ܭ ൌ ൣ݇௠௜௡, ݇௠௔௫൧. The total number of households is ܩሺݕ௠௔௫ሻ, and the 
total car stock is ܪሺ݇௠௔௫ሻ. We take the stock of cars as given and assume that there are more 
households than cars. 
Rewrite the first order condition (1), using Roy’s identity, as: 
డ௙
డ௞ ൌ െ
డ௧
డ௞ െ ݍௌோሺݕ െ ݂ሺ݇ሻ, ߨ݁ሺ݇ሻ ൅ ߬ሻߨ
డ௘
డ௞      (8) 
This condition equates the marginal cost of better quality (higher fixed cost) to the marginal 
benefit (tax savings plus fuel expenditure savings). The left-hand side of this equation can 
                                                            
10 A generalized version in which several of the above assumptions are relaxed is discussed below (see Section 
4.3). 
 
14 
 
therefore be interpreted as the maximum the consumer is willing to pay to realize a marginal 
quality increase. Since the demand for car kilometers is increasing in income, this maximum 
is itself increasing in income. It then easily follows that, given our assumptions on the 
functions t(.) and e(.) mentioned above and given a convex fixed cost function f , consumers 
with a higher income will demand a car of higher quality. 11  Hence, there must be an 
increasing one-to-one relationship between household y and car quality k. We denote this 
‘matching function’ as ݕሺ݇ሻ.  
This result has two consequences. First, cars will be owned by the households with the 
highest incomes, so that we can find the critical income ݕ௖ previously defined (see Section 
2.3) from the equation ܩሺݕ௖ሻ ൌ ܩሺݕ௠௔௫ሻ െ ܪሺ݇௠௔௫ሻ. Second, for every value of ݇ א ܭ we 
can determine ݕሺ݇ሻ -- i.e., the income of the household that will own the car of this particular 
quality -- from the equation  ܩ൫ݕሺ݇ሻ൯ ൌ ܩሺݕ௖ሻ ൅ ܪሺ݇ሻ, or ݕሺ݇ሻ ൌ ܩିଵ൫ܩሺݕ௖ሻ ൅ ܪሺ݇ሻ൯. The 
matching function is determined only by the income distribution and the car stock. Put 
differently: as long as the income distribution and the car stock do not change, the equilibrium 
choice of car quality of a household will not change. Any change in the demand for car 
quality that follows from a change in one of the tax parameters must be balanced by a change 
in the fixed cost function. 
After substitution of ݕ ൌ ݕሺ݇ሻ in the first order condition (8),  we find:  
        డ௙డ௞ ൌ െ
డ௧
డ௞ െ ݍௌோ൫ܩିଵ൫ܩሺݕ௖ሻ ൅ ܪሺ݇ሻ൯ െ ݂ሺ݇ሻ െ ݐሺ݇ሻ, ߨ݁ሺ݇ሻ ൅ ߬൯ߨ
డ௘
డ௞. (9) 
This is a differential equation in f(.). Its solution gives us the fixed opportunity cost (of 
owning cars of different qualities) that equilibrates the car market as a function of the tax 
parameters. 12  We therefore write the solution as f(k; ,  ); it describes how the fixed 
opportunity cost function adapts in order to restore market equilibrium after a tax change. A 
closed form solution of (9) is in general not available, but provided we have an initial value, 
f(k; ,  )  can under general conditions be found by numerical methods (see, e.g., Judd 
(1998)). In Appendix 1 we show that an initial condition is readily available.             
            The method just described will be used to recover f(k; ,  ) for a numerical application 
of the model. That is, we will solve (9) and compare an initial market equilibrium with 
                                                            
11 Note that fuel efficiency is decreasing in k.  
12 It is obvious from (9) that this solution guarantees that for all consumers the first-order condition for utility 
maximization (1) is satisfied at the car quality that is allocated to them. It may also be noted that our setup 
implies that the critical income must be the same before and after the tax change. Since we have implicitly 
assumed that the utility of using public transport does not change, the utility of a household with the critical 
income remains unchanged. Of course, one could easily use the model to study the effect of changes in public 
transport prices on fixed car costs. Alternatively, simultaneous changes in public transport fares and car taxes 
could be studied. 
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alternative equilibria that result from a higher fuel tax or a kilometer charge. We again expect 
different cost adjustments in response to the two different tax instruments. To see why, note 
that (9) can be rewritten in simplified notation as డ௙డ௞ ൌ െ
డ௧
డ௞ െ ܧܺܲ
డ௘
డ௞, where EXP denotes 
expenditure on fuel at the equilibrium assignment of cars to households. Both a higher fuel 
tax and a higher kilometer charge lead to a decrease in the demand for car kilometers. 
However, as higher kilometer charges reduce demand, they lead to an unambiguous decrease 
in fuel expenditures EXP, whereas the higher fuel tax will lead to increased EXP if the 
demand for car kilometers is price inelastic (as suggested by all empirical evidence). This is a 
clear difference between the impact of the two tax instruments on the left-hand-side of (9). Of 
course, the previous argument ignored the fact that EXP depends itself on fixed car costs, 
which will be affected by tax changes. However, it does suggest that the two taxes have a 
qualitatively different impact on the fixed cost function. In view of the above discussion, 
noting that డ௘డ௞ ൏ 0 , a kilometer charge is more likely to reduce the marginal fixed cost 
(݀ డ௙డ௞ ݀ߨ ൏ 0⁄ ); a fuel tax is more likely to raise it (݀
డ௙
డ௞ ݀߬ ൏ 0⁄ ).   
Finally, consider the change in the fixed cost function that results from a change in the 
ownership tax  ݐሺ݇ሻ. Given the structure of our model, equation (9) tells us that in equilibrium 
any change in the car ownership tax ݐሺ݇ሻ must be completely compensated by a change in the 
fixed cost.  
            
3.2 Quality attributes that increase variable car user cost 
The analysis for the case where quality increases the variable user cost is conceptually 
similar, except that we have to take into account that characteristic m is an argument of the 
utility function. The relevant first-order condition is (5), which we rewrite as: 
డ௙
డ௠ ൅
డ௧
డ௠ ൌ ݍௌோሺݕ െ ݂ሺ݉ሻ െ ݐሺ݉ሻ, ߨ݁ሺ݉ሻ ൅ ߬ሻ ቀെ
డ௩ డ௠⁄
డ௩ డ௣⁄ െ ߨ
డ௘
డ௠ቁ  (10) 
The left-hand side is the marginal gross fixed cost of better quality; it consists of a larger 
annual fixed cost and, plausibly, larger fixed tax payments. The right-hand side is the net 
marginal benefit. For this to be positive, the consumer must value the increase in quality 
enough to be willing to bear the additional variable cost. Technically, it must be the case that 
െ డ௩ డ௠⁄డ௩ డ௣⁄    -- which gives the marginal increase in variable cost that keeps the consumer on the 
same indifference curve after a change in car quality -- exceeds ߨ డ௘డ௠ .  
16 
 
Assuming the existence of an increasing matching function ݕሺ݉ሻ, substitution in (10) 
yields a differential equation in car quality m that can be solved numerically in the same way 
as (9).13  
With respect to the ownership tax it is again the case that for the market equilibrium 
only the gross fixed cost matters. Hence a higher ownership tax will imply that in market 
equilibrium depreciation, capital cost and other fixed cost must decrease by the same amount 
to keep gross fixed cost constant. 
              
4. Numerical illustration 
We illustrate the theoretical results derived in the previous sections using a simple 
numerical representation of the model. The model is a generic numerical exercise not 
intended to be a fully realistic representation of any particular given situation, but sufficiently 
rich to capture all major ingredients of the effects of the tax changes considered. We explain 
the model in some detail for the case of a fuel-saving technology; the case of attributes that 
raise the variable user cost is more briefly dealt with towards the end of this section. 
Extensions are discussed in Section 5 below. 
 
4.1 Fuel saving technology 
We proceed in three steps. We present the specification of the model of individual 
household demand used in the numerical exercise. Next we illustrate the implications of 
increases in fuel taxes and of imposing kilometer charges on the demand for car quality 
characteristics. Finally, we consider the changes in the fixed annual opportunity costs of car 
ownership that establish a new market equilibrium.  
 
4.1.1 Specification of the model: functional forms and reference parameters 
The indirect utility function we use is the one Hausman (1981) derived on the basis of 
a linear demand curve: 
                                                            
13 This an be shown when െ ப୴ ப୫⁄ப୴ ப୮⁄   is non-decreasing in y, both  f and t are convex in m, and ቀെ ப୴ ப୫
⁄
ப୴ ப୮⁄ െ π
பୣ
ப୫ቁ is 
decreasing in m. The latter condition is satisfied when െ ப୴ ப୫⁄ப୴ ப୮⁄  is non-increasing in m and e is convex in m. 
These appear to be reasonable conditions, which we assume to be valid. 
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ݒ ൌ ቀఉାఈఊାఉఊሺగ௘ሺ௞ሻାఛሻାఊమ൫௬ି௙ሺ௞ሻି௧ሺ௞ሻ൯ఊమ ቁ ݁ିఊሺగ௘ሺ௞ሻାఛሻ  
It is easy to verify, through Roy’s identity, that the demand for kilometers is indeed linear: 
   ݍௌோ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚሺߨ݁ሺ݇ሻ ൅ ߬ሻ ൅ ߛሺݕ െ ݂ሺ݇ሻ െ ݐሺ݇ሻሻ. 
We assume that inverse fuel efficiency is linear in quality:  
݁ሺ݇ሻ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵ݇ with ߠଵ ൏ 0.  
Furthermore, the annual fixed cost function is specified as: 
݂ሺ݇ሻ ൌ ܣ ൅ ܤ݇ ൅ ܥ݁஽൫௞ି௞೘೔೙൯  
where A, B, C and D are constants, and mink is the minimum car quality on the market. The 
annual fixed ownership cost is increasing in k when ܤ ൅ ܥܦ݁஽൫௞ି௞೘೔೙൯ ൐ 0 and convex when 
ܥ ൐ 0. Moreover, note that when ݇ ൌ ݇௠௜௡we have  min min( )f k A Bk C   . At this fixed 
cost, the parameters must be such that the household is indifferent between having a car and 
using public transport, while the marginal cost B is determined by (9). Therefore, the value of 
A+C must be such that these two requirements are met. In the numerical exercise below, the 
parameters will be chosen such that all the above conditions are satisfied. 
Indirect utility of public transport users is specified as: 
 ݒ௉் ൌ ሺߙߛ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߚߛ݌௣௧ሻ ൅ ߛଶݕ ൅ ߜߛ݉௣௧ሻ ଵఊమ ݁ିఊ൫௣
೛೟ାሺఋ/ఉሻ௠೛೟൯ . 
The demand for public transport kilometers is linear in income and variable cost, as well as in 
the public transport quality variable ݉௣௧. If the parameter ߜ is positive, as will be assumed 
below, demand for public transport is increasing in quality.14  
The parameter values that will be used in the simulations are listed in Table 1. A 
number of assumptions underlie the choice of the parameter set. Consider the (inverse) fuel 
efficiency function. We let the quality indicator k vary continuously between 0 and 10. Fuel 
use per kilometer driven is assumed to equal 0.20 (or 20 liters per 100 kilometer) for cars with 
the lowest quality (kmin=0); hence, we set ߠ଴ ൌ .2. We further choose ߠଵ ൌ െ0.015, which 
implies that fuel use decreases to 5 liter per 100 kilometer for cars with the highest quality 
(kmax=10). This figure is quite realistic as an estimate of average fuel consumption (averaging 
over urban and non-urban road sections) for the most fuel efficient cars on the market.  
The demand parameters were determined such that the price elasticity of demand for 
car kilometers is equal to -0,10 and the income elasticity for a specific reference case equal to 
0.5 (viz., when income equals €50.000, fixed costs equals €5,624, 15,000 kilometers are 
driven annually, variable cost is €0.17 and quality equals 5.84). We let income vary between 
                                                            
14 It is not difficult to verify that the single crossing condition is satisfied when ݌௣௧ ൅ ሺߜ/ߚሻ݉௣௧ ൐  ݁ሺ݇ሻ ; 
parameters are such that this is the case for any admissible value of car quality k.   
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€10,000 and €75,000. The chosen values of the parameters imply that the critical income ݕ௖ 
equals €15,000. At this critical income a car of the lowest quality (k=0) is optimal, while at 
the highest income the highest quality (k=10) is chosen.  
The fixed cost function was specified increasing and convex in k, see above. 
Moreover, to keep the interpretation as transparent as possible, parameters were calibrated so 
as to make the relation between demand for quality and income linear15. The parameter values 
that achieve this are also given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Numerical values for the simulations with one-dimensional quality 
Parameter Interpretation Numerical value 
ߙ Intercept demand function 9,547 
ߚ Price sensitivity of demand -9,375 
ߛ Income sensitivity of demand 0.15 
ࢾ Quality sensitivity of demand 240 
   
ߠ଴ Intercept of fuel use function 0.20 
ߠଵ Quality sensitivity of fuel use -0.015 
   
A  
Parameters of the cost function 
-2.2827 x 106 
B 7906.25 
C 2.2867 x 106  
D -0.003375 
   
ݕ௠௔௫ Maximum income 75,000 
ݕ௠௜௡ Minimum income 10,000 
   
݇௠௔௫ Maximum quality 10 
݇௠௜௡ Minimum quality 0 
    
ppt Price per km of public transport 0.05 
mpt Quality indicator public transport -50 
 
 
                                                            
15 It is easy to show that this requires 1DC  . 
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4.1.2. The effects of tax changes on demand for car quality 
We use the model specified above to study the impact of various tax changes on the 
demand for car quality. For simplicity, we assume that in the reference situation, the 
ownership tax t and the kilometer charge ߬ are equal to zero, and we let the initial fuel price 
be equal to 1.5. The marginal fixed cost of better quality increases from slightly more than 
€150 for k=0 to well over €300 for k=10. The annual number of kilometers driven is slightly 
higher than 10,000 for consumers with the critical income level (€ 15,000), and it increases to 
more than 19,000 for consumers with the maximum income (€ 75,000). The effect of the 
higher income is mitigated by the increase in fixed car cost. Higher income raises the demand 
for kilometers, but also leads to higher quality demand and, hence, a higher fixed cost. Since 
the fixed cost is nonlinear in quality (which is itself linearly related to income) this effect is 
stronger for the higher incomes. Car quality itself has a limited positive effect on the annual 
number of kilometers driven: one additional unit of quality implies that some 120 extra 
kilometers will be driven per year. 
We first analyze the implications of an increase in fuel taxes. Starting from the 
reference situation, we investigate what happens if a tax increase raises the fuel price by 20% 
(from €1.5 to €1.8). The theory showed that this raises the demand for better fuel efficiency, 
and the simulation results reported in Figure 1 suggest that these effects may be substantial. 
The curve denoted ‘original price’ gives the demand for quality as a function of income 
before the price increase. The curve denoted ‘high price’ is the simulated relation between 
quality and income after the increase in fuel tax.16 In line with expectations, we see that there 
is now excess demand for cars of the highest quality, whereas demand for cars of the lowest 
qualities disappears completely. More specifically, we find that cars of the highest available 
quality (k=10) are now demanded by all consumers with an income of €54,807 or more. Since 
car driving becomes more expensive, the critical income shifts upwards to €18,488. As a 
consequence, cars of the lowest qualities (below k=2.0) are no longer demanded. Note that 
demand increases are most pronounced at the high income levels. 
   
                                                            
16 The first one is linear by construction, see above. Although this is not clearly visible, the second one is no 
longer linear. 
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Figure 1. The shift in demand for fuel-saving technology: an increase in the fuel price 
 
Next, let us see what happens if we keep the fuel price at its reference level (€1.50) 
and introduce a kilometer charge. An increase in the fuel price of €0.30 implied an increase in 
the variable cost of approximately €0.0375 for the average car of quality k=5; to make the 
results comparable to those found for the fuel tax increase, we set the kilometer charge at 
€0.0375.   
As convincingly argued in the theoretical sections of the paper, the resulting shift in 
demand is indeed quite different from that implied by the fuel tax change. A kilometer tax 
leads to a decline in the demand for fuel efficiency enhancing technology. This is clearly 
illustrated in Figure 2. Although the changes in quality demand are modest, demand declines 
for car owners at all income levels. The implication is that demand for the top quality cars 
disappears. We find that the new critical income level is € 17,344 and at this income the 
optimal quality level is 0. This implies a decrease in optimal quality of 0.39. At the highest 
income of € 75,000, optimal quality is 9.6, which means that demand for the highest quality 
levels (k>9.6) disappears. Together these findings imply that more households would decide 
to no longer own a car at the prevailing fixed annual cost function. 
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Figure 2. The shift in demand for quality k (fuel-saving technology)  
caused by a kilometer charge 
 
4.1.3. Taxes and price adjustments at the market level 
The simulations we just presented show that increases in taxes have substantial effects 
on the demand for car characteristics by individual households. We suggested above that, 
since the total car stock is given in the short run (as new car sales are a small part of the total 
car market), these demand adjustments may imply a substantial distortion in the original 
equilibrium. In this section, we illustrate the adaptations in the annual fixed opportunity cost 
of owning different quality cars that restore market equilibrium. 
As the numerical model only serves illustrative purposes, we use very simple income 
and quality distributions. Specifically, we assume G and H are both uniform: 
 ܩሺݕሻ ൌ ௬ି௬೘೔೙௬೘ೌೣି௬೘೔೙ ,   ܪሺ݇ሻ ൌ
௞ି௞೘೔೙
௞೘ೌೣି௞೘೔೙.  
It then follows that ܩିଵ൫ܩሺݕ௖ሻ ൅ ܪሺ݇ሻ൯ ൌ ݕ௖ ൅ ൫݇ െ ݇௠௜௡൯൫ݕ௠௔௫ െ ݕ௠௜௡൯/൫݇௠௔௫ െ
݇௠௜௡ሻ. In combination with the linear demand equation specified before, differential equation 
(9) becomes: 
 డ௙డ௞ ൌ െ
డ௧
డ௞ െ ሺߙ ൅ ߚ݌ሺ݇ሻ ൅ ߛ ൬ݕ௖ ൅ ൫݇ െ ݇௠௜௡൯
൫௬೘ೌೣି௬೘೔೙൯
൫௞೘ೌೣି௞೘೔೙൯ െ ݂ሺ݇ሻ െ ݐሺ݇ሻ൰ ߨߠଵ 
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In Appendix 2 we discuss the solution of this differential equation for f(k; ,  ). Here we just 
report the results of using f(k; ,  ) to study the impact of tax changes on the equilibrium 
opportunity cost of owning cars of different qualities.   
Consider the increase in the fuel price from 1.5 to 1.8 euro we looked at before. There 
are three aspects to the adjustment in the fixed ownership opportunity cost function. First, the 
higher demand for fuel efficiency at all income levels we found before (see Figure 1) raises 
the relative demand for more fuel efficient cars. For cars of the highest quality, there was 
excess demand at the original cost function. Second, the higher marginal value of fuel saving 
makes the cost function steeper. Third, the car stock is fixed, so that the lower part of the 
quality distribution must necessarily become cheaper.  
Figure 3a shows the final result of the adjustment; it gives f(.) in the initial and in the 
new equilibrium. It shows indeed a downward shift in the fixed opportunity costs over quite 
an extended range of quality levels. Fixed costs of owning the best quality cars increase. This 
is also clear from Figure 3a; Figure 3b shows it more in detail. Finally, note from Figure 4 
that the marginal fixed cost of a change in quality increases at all levels of quality, but more 
so for the highest qualities. The marginal fixed cost also increases at relatively low quality to 
prevent the realization of the upward shift in quality that results from the higher returns to 
better fuel efficiency.  
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a) Shift in equilibrium fixed cost f(k) due to fuel tax increase  
(whole quality range) 
 
b) Shift in equilibrium fixed cost f(k) due to fuel tax increase  
(highest qualities) 
Figure 3. Equilibrium fixed cost functions (fuel saving quality) before  
and after a fuel tax increase 
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Figure 4. Marginal fixed cost before and after the fuel tax increase  
 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the adjustment to a new market equilibrium after imposing 
the kilometer tax discussed in the previous section. At given fixed costs, this was shown 
before to reduce the demand for fuel efficiency so that one expects a downward adjustment in 
market prices towards a new equilibrium. Figure 5 indeed illustrates this downward shift. 
Marginal fixed costs decrease slightly, consistent with the discussion in Section 3.1. The 
decrease is virtually independent of the quality level k. 
 
 
Figure 5. Equilibrium fixed cost functions (fuel saving quality) 
before and after introduction of a kilometer charge  
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Figure 6. Marginal fixed cost function (fuel saving quality)  
in equilibrium before and after introduction of a kilometer charge  
 
Finally, we provide some numerical results of the simulations in Table 2. It should be 
kept in mind that there is large heterogeneity in the effects of the tax changes. For households 
with the critical income, a fuel tax increase is compensated exactly by the reduction in fixed 
cost, whereas households with the highest incomes experience an increase in fixed annual 
costs on top of the increase in variable costs. With a kilometer charge, all households 
experience some compensation for the higher variable cost through the induced change in 
fixed opportunity cost. Table 2 therefore illustrates the implications of the fuel tax and the 
kilometer charge at three income levels: the critical income level (the income for the marginal 
car owner), average income and the highest income considered. 
This leads to several observations. First, it confirms that a fuel price increase raises 
variable costs but reduces fixed annual opportunity costs, except for the high income users of 
the most fuel efficient cars; the demand increases for these cars push annual fixed opportunity 
costs of ownership upward. The marginal fixed cost of a car of rises at all quality levels, but 
mostly so for the most fuel efficient car types. Note that total annual costs (variable plus 
fixed) for the least fuel efficient cars actually go down: these cars become cheaper in terms of 
ownership cost, and they are used for substantially fewer kilometers. Second, the table 
illustrates that kilometer taxes have a smaller effect on demand for kilometers and on fuel 
consumption, especially for the least fuel efficient cars. Third, the results illustrate that fuel 
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Table 2. Implications for drivers with low, average and high income (fuel saving quality)    
Income y 15000 45000 75000 
Initial situation    
Quality k 0 5 10 
Kilometer demand q 8,371 13,739 19,018 
fuel efficiency 0.200 0.125 0.050 
total fuel use 1,674 1,717 951 
total variable cost 2,512 2,576 1,426 
fixed cost 4,085 5,330 7,173 
marginal fixed cost 188 309 428 
total cost 6,597 7,906 8,590 
Increase in fuel 
Price 
   
Quality k 0 5 10 
Kilometer demand q 7,882 13,432 18,870 
fuel efficiency 0.200 0.125 0.050 
total fuel use 1,576 1679 944 
total variable cost 2,838 3022 1698 
fixed cost 3,598 5038 7219 
marginal fixed cost 213 363 509 
total cost 6,435 8,060 8,918 
compensating variation 
ex ante 
-488 -510 -285 
compensating variation 
ex post 
0 -218 -330 
Kilometer charge    
Quality k 0 5 10 
Demand for kilometers 
q 
8,066 13,440 18,723 
fuel efficiency 0.200 0.125 0.050 
total fuel use 1,613 1,680 936 
total variable cost 2,722 3,024 2,106 
fixed cost 3,777 4.988 6,798 
marginal fixed cost 181 302 421 
total cost 6,500 8,012 8,904 
compensating variation 
ex ante 
-308 -510 -709 
compensating variation 
ex post 
0 -168 -333 
 
taxes (except for most fuel efficient cars) and kilometer charges both reduce fixed opportunity 
costs. However, in line with theory, a fuel tax raises the marginal fixed cost of better fuel 
efficiency, a kilometer tax reduces it. Moreover, the fixed annual costs of the most fuel 
efficient cars decline much less in the case of a kilometer charge. Fourth, note that the cost 
adaptations at the market level imply that tax changes have fairly limited effects on demand 
and fuel consumption. 
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Finally, we also calculated the compensating variation as an indicator of the welfare effects of 
the fuel price increase and the kilometer charge. As suggested by Table 2, they are quite large 
when computed ex ante (before the reaction in the fixed opportunity cost is taken into 
account), ranging between 300 and 700 euro. They are much larger for a kilometer tax that for 
a fuel tax for those car drivers owning highly fuel efficient cars; the opposite holds for low 
income individuals driving cars that are not very fuel efficient. When calculated ex post (after 
the fixed cost adjustment) the compensation variations are substantially smaller, except in the 
case of high income people when the fuel tax is increased. They range between 0 at the 
critical income to about 350 euro.     
 
4.2 Variable cost increasing in quality 
To simulate the effect of tax changes on the demand for quality characteristics that 
yield direct utility to the driver but raise the variable cost per kilometer (acceleration speed, 
engine power, etc.), we have to adapt the model on two accounts. First, we introduce car 
quality m into the (indirect) utility function as follows:    
ݒௌோ ൌ ൫ߙߛ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߚߛሺߨ݁ሺ݉ሻ ൅ ߬ሻ ൅ ߛଶ൫ݕ െ ݂ሺ݉ሻ൯ ൅ ߜߛ݉൯ 1ߛଶ ݁
ିఊ൫ሺߨ݁ሺ݉ሻ൅߬ሻାሺఋ/ఉሻ௠൯ 
The demand function is then  
 ݍௌோ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚሺߨ݁ሺ݉ሻ ൅ ߬ሻ ൅ ߛሺݕ െ ݂ሺ݇ሻ െ ݐሺ݇ሻሻ ൅ ߜ݇.  
The value of ߜ already reported in Table 1 implies a modest effect of quality on the demand 
for kilometers: an increase of one point implies that annually 240 km per year more will be 
driven. 
Second, we have to adapt the parameters of the variable and fixed cost functions. The 
parameters of the variable cost function 0 1( )e m m    are now both positive, because better 
quality raises fuel consumption. We specify the parameters so that, for the car with average 
quality, fuel use remains unchanged to what it was in the previous subsection. The parameters 
of the fixed opportunity cost function have been chosen in such a way that the allocation of 
quality to incomes is initially identical to that of the previous subsection. That is, for 
consumers with a particular income y the optimal quality m has the same value as the optimal 
quality k associated with that income in the previous subsection. This implies, among other     
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Table 3. Numerical values for the variable cost function (fuel-using quality) 
ߠ଴ Intercept of fuel use function 0.075 
ߠଵ Quality sensitivity of fuel use 0.010 
    
A   
 
Parameters of the cost function 
-4.4331 x 106 
B  7162.5 
C  4.4389 x 106 
D  -0.00159 
 
things, that the critical income is also identical to that in the previous subsection. We 
summarize parameter values in Table 3. 
We simulate the same tax changes as in the previous subsection. Consistent with the 
theory, a fuel tax increase shifts demand for better quality downwards, because higher quality 
raises fuel consumption. The effects are illustrated on Figure 7. A 20% increase in fuel prices 
clearly has a large impact on demand. A large number of households (all households with 
incomes up to more than € 42400) prefer to have cars of the lowest quality. Given the 
prevailing fixed annual ownership cost, nobody demands a car with quality higher than m=3.6 
anymore.  
  
 
Figure 7. The shift in demand for quality (fuel-using quality) caused by 
an increase in the fuel tax 
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For the effects of a kilometer charge no graphical illustration is provided. Again there 
is a downward shift in optimal car quality that varies between -0.42 at the new critical income 
(€ 17,500) to -1.15 at the highest income (€ 75,000). 
Finally, using the specifications introduced before, the shift in the fixed annual cost 
function that reestablishes car market equilibrium can be analyzed by solving the following 
differential equation 
 డ௙డ௠ ൅
డ௧
డ௠ ൌ ቆߙ ൅ ߚ݌ሺ݉ሻ ൅ ߛ ቆݕ௖ ൅ ൫݉ െ ݉௠௜௡൯
൫௬೘ೌೣି௬೘೔೙൯
൫௠೘ೌೣି௠೘೔೙൯ െ ݂ሺ݇ሻ െ ݐሺ݇ሻቇ ൅
                                                                                                                                         ߜ݉ቇ ቀെ ఋఉ െ ߨߠଵቁ 
Let, as before, a fuel tax increase raise the unit user cost by 20%. A graphical 
illustration of the adjustment in the annual fixed cost is given on Figure 8: it shows the fixed 
cost functions that correspond to the initial and the new equilibrium. Fixed costs go down for 
all quality levels, but mostly so for the highest quality cars: they become less attractive when 
fuel prices increase.   
 
 
Figure 8. Equilibrium fixed cost functions (fuel-using quality) before  
and after a change in the fuel tax  
 
 Figure 9 shows the change in the marginal fixed cost induced by an increase in the fuel 
price. Given the large distortion in the original market equilibrium that was caused by the fuel 
price increase, we find that the changes in the fixed costs needed to restore a market 
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equilibrium are substantial. The marginal fixed cost declines, and it declines most at high 
quality. Note that it is somewhat lower than in the case of a fuel saving quality indicator; 
quality now raises variable costs, and it provides additional utility. 
  
 
Figure 9. Marginal fixed costs (fuel spending quality) before and after 
a change in the fuel price  
 
The fixed cost function corresponding to the market equilibrium with the kilometer 
charge is again almost parallel to the original one. It is not shown to save space.  
Finally, some numerical results are summarized in Table 4 for drivers at three income 
levels. Interpretation is as before. Note that the taxes have rather limited effects on demand 
and on fuel use. Variable user costs do increase substantially and fixed costs decline,  
especially for the highest quality cars.    
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Table 5. Implications for drivers with low, average and high income (fuel-using quality)    
y  15000  45000  75000 
Reference situation       
Quality m  0  5 10 
Kilometer demand q  9,873  14,772  19,632 
fuel efficiency  0.075  0.125  0.175 
total fuel use  740  1,846  3,436 
total variable cost  1,111  2,770 5,153 
fixed cost  5,796  6,450  7,362 
marginal fixed cost  105  157  208 
total cost  6,907  9,219  12,515 
Increase in fuel tax   
Quality m  0  5  10 
Kilometer demand q  9,695  14,482  19,242 
fuel efficiency  0.075  0.125 0.175 
total fuel use  727  1,810  3,367 
total variable cost  1,309  3,259  6,061 
fixed cost  5,576  6,036  6,677 
marginal fixed cost  74  110 146 
total cost  6,885  9,294  12,738 
compensating variation 
ex ante 
‐220  ‐549  ‐1,022 
compensating variation 
ex post 
0  ‐135  ‐337 
Introduction kilometer 
tax 
     
Quality m  0  5  10 
Kilometer demand q  9,576  14,477 19,340 
fuel efficiency  0.075  0.125 0.175 
total fuel use  718  1,810  3,384 
total variable cost  1,436  3,257  5,802 
fixed cost  5,432  6,069 6,966 
marginal fixed cost  102  153  205 
total cost  6,868  9,327  12,768 
compensating variation 
ex ante 
‐365  ‐549  ‐732 
compensating variation 
ex post 
0  ‐169  ‐336 
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5. Extensions 
The model developed in this paper was deliberately kept simple so as to bring out the 
most relevant insights in the most transparent way. In this section, we briefly suggest a 
number of obvious extensions. First, in reality, of course, people care for a variety of car 
characteristics. Although generalization to multiple characteristics is conceptually 
straightforward, the model becomes substantially more complicated to handle. Most 
importantly, extending the theory for multiple characteristics does not lead to extra insights. 
We did extend both the theory and the numerical model by looking at two-dimensional 
quality, allowing both characteristics to provide direct consumer utility. The theory did not 
change our main qualitative findings in any way. The results of dealing with two quality 
attributes in the numerical model are reported in Appendix 3. Second, it seems desirable to 
allow for taste differences apart from income differences. This can be done by re-specifying 
the parameter ߙ, which has hitherto been considered as a scalar constant as the sum of a 
deterministic and a random term: ߙ ൌ ߙത ൅ ߝ, where ߝ has mean zero. It is then possible to 
rewrite the demand function as: 
 ݍௌோ ൌ ߙത ൅ ߚሺߨ݁ሺ݈ሻ ൅ ߬ሻ ൅ ߛ ቀݕ ൅ ఌఊ െ ݂ሺ݇ሻ െ ݐሺ݇ሻቁ. 
We can now interpret ݕᇱ ൌ ݕ ൅ ఌఊ as income that is augmented for differences in the taste for 
car kilometers. If the simultaneous distribution of income ݕ and the random variable ߝ  is 
known, we can derive the distribution of ݕᇱ and proceed just as we did before to derive the 
equilibrium fixed cost function. Finally, an obvious extension is to allow the relations 
between costs and quality to be nonlinear.  
 
6. Conclusion 
A recent empirical literature (see, e.g., Busse et al. (2009)) suggests that fuel price 
changes have large effects on the prices of second hand cars, which suggests that a market 
level analysis is needed to get a complete picture of the implications of fuel price changes 
and, by implication, of other changes in variable user costs. This paper attempts to provide a 
better understanding of the impact of fuel price changes and different variable user taxes on 
the car market..  We distinguish cars that differ in terms of two quality characteristics. The 
first one (say,  better fuel technology) improves fuel efficiency, the second one (for example, 
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engine power) )  increases fuel use. Moreover, we focus on fuel taxes and kilometer charges 
as the main variable tax instruments.  
In a first step, we studied the effect of variable user taxes on individual behavior. We 
found substantial qualitative differences in the implications of a fuel tax and a kilometer 
charge  at the individual levels. . For example, a higher kilometer tax reduces the demand or 
fuel efficient cars, whereas an increase in the fuel tax induces households to choose cars of 
better fuel efficiency, provided that the demand for car use is inelastic. Looking at quality 
characteristics that raise variable user costs (engine size, acceleration speed,…), we found that 
higher fuel taxes plausibly induce households to demand cars of lower quality. In a second 
step, the models were embedded into an equilibrium model for the car market, using a simple 
assignment model in which higher income households choose better cars.  Equilibrium at the 
market level could be described by a ‘hedonic’ function that relates fixed car costs to quality. 
We show that changes in fuel taxes or kilometer charges cause large disruptions in the 
original market equilibrium that call for substantial changes in car prices to restore 
equilibrium for all car makes. In general, these changes in fixed car costs compensate partly 
for the changes in the variable costs that result from the change in the fuel tax or the kilometer 
charge, although with fuel saving quality we find that the fixed cost of the highest quality cars 
may increase.  
The analysis of this paper has clearly shown that studying the implications of taxation 
at the household level can be highly inadequate, as large adjustments may take place at the 
market level. Future work could address the connection between the approach adopted here 
and a small literature that takes an asset market approach to the study of the car market (Kahn 
( 1986), Engers et al. (2009)). The idea is that the car is an investment good whose value is 
determined by that of the future services (car miles driven) to be derived from it. When 
variable car costs change, the value of these services change as well and this has implications 
for the price of the car itself, as is the case in our analysis. However, this approach seems to 
ignore the impact of the existing stock of cars on price formation that is central in the analysis 
of the present paper, and thus seems more suitable for a long run analysis. 
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Appendix 1. Initial condition 
An initial condition is straightforward to derive from two other requirements of a 
market equilibrium. One is that a household with the critical income should be indifferent 
between having a car and using public transport and that all car owning households, including 
those with the critical income, chose their optimal car quality. The first requirement says that 
we must have: 
  ݒௌோ൫ݕ௖ െ ݂൫݇௠௜௡൯ െ ݐ൫݇௠௜௡൯, ߨ݁൫݇௠௜௡൯ ൅ ߬൯ ൌ ݒሺݕ௖, ݌௣௧, ݉௣௧ሻ  
This equation can be solved for ݂൫݇௠௜௡൯. The second implies that the first order condition 
must be valid at the critical income: 
  డ௙డ௞ ൌ െ
డ௧
డ௞ െ ݍௌோ൫ݕ௖ െ ݂൫݇௠௜௡൯ െ ݐ൫݇௠௜௡൯, ߨ݁൫݇௠௜௡൯ ൅ ߬൯ߨ
డ௘
డ௞  
This gives us the value of డ௙డ௞ for ݇ ൌ ݇௠௜௡. Knowledge of the value and the first derivative of 
the fixed cost function at ݇ ൌ ݇௠௜௡ gives us the initial condition from which we can find the 
whole fixed cost function f(k). Noting that the solution of (9) clearly depends on the tax 
parameters, it therefore tells us how the fixed cost function will change in order to restore 
market equilibrium after a tax change.  
 
Appendix 2. Solution method of the differential equation  
In the text we pointed out that assuming  
 ܩሺݕሻ ൌ ௬ି௬೘೔೙௬೘ೌೣି௬೘೔೙ ,   ܪሺ݇ሻ ൌ
௞ି௞೘೔೙
௞೘ೌೣି௞೘೔೙.  
transforms differential equation (9) into: 
 డ௙డ௞ ൌ െ
డ௧
డ௞ െ ሺߙ ൅ ߚ݌ሺ݇ሻ ൅ ߛ ൬ݕכ ൅ ൫݇ െ ݇௠௜௡൯
൫௬೘ೌೣି௬೘೔೙൯
൫௞೘ೌೣି௞೘೔೙൯ െ ݂ሺ݇ሻ െ ݐሺ݇ሻ൰ ߨߠଵ 
In fact, this can be solved in closed form for a value of ݂൫݇௠௜௡൯ that still has to be determined 
as: 
 ݂ሺ݇ሻ ൌ ܣሺߨ, ߬ሻ ൅ ܤሺߨሻ݇ ൅ ܥ ቀߨ, ߬, ݂൫݇௠௜௡൯ቁ ݁ఊ൫௞ି௞೘೔೙൯ሺగఏభሻ     
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where A, B and C are functions of the parameters of the model. Although these functions can 
be written down, it is not easy to derive transparent comparative static results from the 
formulas. Therefore, we use a simulation approach. 
 
Appendix 3: solving the model with two quality aspects 
Specification of the model 
Consider the household problem: 
max௫,௤,௞,௠ ݑሺݔ, ݍ; ݇, ݉ሻ    ݏ. ݐ.      ݔ ൅ ሾ݂ሺ݇, ݉ሻ ൅ ݐሺ݇, ݉ሻሿ ൅ ሾ݌ሺߨ, ݇. ݉ሻ ൅ ߬ሿݍ ൌ ݕ  
Apart from dealing with k and m jointly, we have allowed both attributes to yield direct 
utility. This allows, for instance, ‘green’ tastes in which the consumers derives utility from 
driving a more fuel efficient cars, independent of the consequences of this behavior for fixed 
and variable costs. It also covers the case in which improved fuel efficiency is related to the 
‘newness’ of a car, which can be defined as the difference between some maximum age and 
the actual age of the car.17 Newer cars of a particular make often embody better technology, 
including improved fuel efficiency.  
We only discuss the simulation results of a specific version of the model in which 
quality, now denoted as l, is an index of k and m . Specifically, short-run (indirect) utility is: 
ݒௌோ ൌ ൫ߙߛ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߚߛሺߨ݁ሺ݈ሻ ൅ ߬ሻ ൅ ߛଶ൫ݕ െ ݂ሺ݈ሻ൯ ൅ ߜߛ݉൯ 1ߛଶ ݁
ିఊ൫ሺߨ݁ሺ݈ሻ൅߬ሻାሺఋ/ఉሻ௟൯ 
 Here ݈ is: 
 ݈ ൌ ߤଵ݇ ൅ ߤଶ݉.        
 Moreover, we reformulate the fuel use function as: 
 ݁ሺ݇, ݉ሻ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵ݇ ൅ ߠଶ݉ 
with ߠଵ ൏ 0 and ߠଶ ൐ 0.  
The first-order conditions for optimal quality choice are now: 
డ௙
డ௞ ൌ ݍௌோ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଵ െ ߨߠଵቁ,       (A3.1) 
 డ௙డ௠ ൌ ݍௌோ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଶ െ ߨߠଶቁ        (A3.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
17 Equivalently, newness can be interpreted as the (expected) remaining lifetime of the car. 
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Solution of the model 
 
To solve the model, we observe from (A3.1)-(A3.2) that the partial derivatives of the 
fixed cost function f with respect to m and k are proportional. It follows that we can regard f as 
a function of a single variable, that we denote as z: 
 ݖ ൌ ቀെ ఋఉ ߤଵ െ ߨߠଵቁ ݉ ൅ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଶ െ ߨߠଶቁ ݇.     
Intuitively the variable z can itself be interpreted as a kind of quality index. We assume 
throughout that ቀെ ఋఉ ߤଵ െ ߨߠଵቁ ൐ 0  and ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଶ െ ߨߠଶቁ ൐ 0 , which means that z is 
increasing in both quality aspects.  Note, however, that this index refers to the consumer’s 
preference for quality as well as to the impact of quality on variable cost and that it therefore 
also depends on the fuel price. Put differently, if the fuel price changes the quality index z will 
in general also change. 
We can also write demand for kilometers as a function of z. The utility function is still 
defined as in section 3.2, but we now with l as defined above substituted for m. It is not 
difficult to verify that we can write the demand function as:  
  ݍௌோ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚሺߨሺߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵ݉ ൅ ߠଶ݇ሻ ൅ ߬ሻ ൅ ߛ൫ݕ െ ݂ሺݖሻ൯ ൅ ߜሺߤଵ݉ ൅ ߤଶ݇ሻ 
          ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚሺߨߠ଴ ൅ ߬ሻ െ ߚݖ ൅ ߛ൫ݕ െ ݂ሺݖሻ൯ 
Using the new variable z, we can reformulate the condition for optimal quality choice as: 
 డ௙డ௭ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚሺߨߠ଴ ൅ ߬ሻ െ ߚݖ ൅ ߛ൫ݕ െ ݂ሺݖሻ൯. 
 It is not difficult to verify that the short run indirect utility function can also be written as a 
function of z, and that it is increasing in z. The same reasoning that we used above can be used 
to show that both quality aspects are normal goods. It follows that in equilibrium the 
households with the highest incomes will use the cars with the highest z. 
If we know the car stock, i.e. the distribution of m and k, we can derive the distribution 
of z from that of m and k. For the purposes of our simulation exercises, we assume these 
variables to be uniformly distributed over intervals ൣ݉௠௜௡, ݉௠௔௫൧ and ൣ݇௠௜௡, ݇௠௔௫൧: 
 ܪሺ݉, ݇ ሻ ൌ ቀ௠ି௠
೘೔೙ቁቀ௞ ି௞೘೔೙ቁ
൫௠೘ೌೣି௠೘೔೙൯൫௞೘ೌೣି௞೘೔೙൯. 
The associated density is ݄ሺ݉, ݇ሻ ൌ 1/൫݉௠௔௫ െ ݉௠௜௡൯൫݇௠௔௫ െ ݇௠௜௡൯. 
 To derive the distribution of z, we introduce four special values of this variable: 
 ݖ௠௜௡ ൌ ቀെ ఋఉ ߤଵ െ ߨߠଵቁ ݉௠௜௡ ൅ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଶ െ ߨߠଶቁ ݇௠௜௡ 
 ̂ݖ ൌ ቀെ ఋఉ ߤଵ െ ߨߠଵቁ ݉௠௜௡ ൅ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଶ െ ߨߠଶቁ ݇௠௔௫  
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 ̂ݖመ ൌ ቀെ ఋఉ ߤଵ െ ߨߠଵቁ ݉௠௔௫ ൅ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଶ െ ߨߠଶቁ ݇௠௜௡  
 ݖ௠௔௫ ൌ ቀെ ఋఉ ߤଵ െ ߨߠଵቁ ݉௠௔௫ ൅ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଶ െ ߨߠଶቁ ݇௠௔௫  
These four values refer to the corners of the support of m and k, as is shown in Figure A1. The 
rectangle in this Figure delineates the boundary of the support. It is clear from the definitions 
given above that ݖ௠௜௡ ൏ ݖ௠௔௫ and that ̂ݖ and ̂ݖመ are in between. These four points refer to the 
corners of the support of (k1,k2), as shown in Figure 7. The rectangle drawn in this Figure 
shows the support of H. Figure A1 also shows the ‘indifference curves’ related to ̂ݖ and ̂ݖመ. 
These lines give all the feasible combinations of the two quality aspects that lead to the values 
̂ݖ and ̂ݖመ, respectively. It is not difficult to verify that these indifference curves of z are straight 
lines with the same slope and that they refer to higher values of z if we move to the right and 
upwards. In Figure A1, ̂ݖ ൐ ̂ݖመ, but this is not necessarily the case. If the slope െ ቀെ ఋఉ ߤଵ െ
ߨߠଵቁ / ቀെ ఋఉ ߤଶ െ ߨߠଶቁ  of the indifference curves were larger in absolute value, the 
indifference curve starting from ̂ݖ could have crossed the lower boundary of the support to the 
left of ̂ݖመ, and in that situation the indifference curve starting from ̂ݖመ would have crossed the 
upper boundary to the right of ̂ݖመ. 
 
Figure A1. The distribution of the two quality aspects 
ݖ௠௜௡ 
ݖ௠௔௫ ̂ݖ 
̂ݖመ 
݇ଶ 
݇ଵ ݇ଵ௠௔௫݇ଵ
௠௜௡ 
݇ଶ௠௜௡ 
݇ଶ௠௔௫  
A 
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 Let ܪ෩ሺݖሻ  denote the distribution of z and ෨݄ሺݖሻ  the associated density. 18  Define 
ݖҧ ൌ min ൛̂ݖ, ̂ݖመൟ and ݖҧҧ ൌ max ൛̂ݖ, ̂ݖመൟ. For ݖ ൏ ݖҧ, ܪ෩ሺݖሻ is proportional to the surface of the 
triangle below the indifference curve associated with z on the support of k1 and k2. In Figure 
A1, an example is given by A. We can derive: 
 ܪ෩ሺݖሻ ൌ ଵଶ ቆ
௭ିቀିഃഁఓభିగఏభቁ௞భ೘೔೙
ቀିഃഁఓమିగఏమቁ
െ ݇ଶ௠௜௡ቇ ቆ
௭ିቀିഃഁఓమିగఏమቁ௞మ೘೔೙
ቀିഃഁఓభିగఏభቁ
െ ݇ଵ௠௜௡ቇ  
            ൌ ଵଶ
൫௭ି௭೘೔೙൯మ
ቀିഃഁఓమିగఏమቁቀି
ഃ
ഁఓభିగఏభቁ
 
and for the density we derive through differentiation: 
 ෨݄ሺݖሻ ൌൌ ௭ି௭೘೔೙ቀିഃഁఓభିగఏభቁቀିഃഁఓమିగఏమቁ
  
This shows that ෨݄ሺݖሻ is linearly increasing for ݖ௠௜௡ ൑ ݖ ൑ ݖҧ, with ෨݄൫ݖ௠௜௡൯ ൌ 0. 
Following the same reasoning, it can be shown that the density of z is constant for  
ݖҧ ൑ ݖ ൑ ݖҧҧ, and linearly decreasing for  ݖҧҧ ൑ ݖ ൑ ݖ௠௔௫, with ෨݄ሺݖ௠௔௫ሻ ൌ 0. The density of z is 
symmetric on its support ൣݖ௠௜௡, ݖ௠௔௫൧. 
 Summarizing the discussion, we can say that the density of z is: 
 ෨݄ሺݖሻ ൌ ൞
ܽ൫ݖ െ ݖ௠௜௡൯                          if ݖ௠௜௡ ൑ ݖ ൑ ݖҧ 
ܽ൫ݖҧ െ ݖ௠௜௡൯                   if ݖҧ ൑ ݖ ൑ ݖҧҧ
ܽ ቀ൫ݖҧ െ ݖ௠௜௡൯ െ ሺݖ െ ݖҧҧሻቁ   if ݖҧҧ ൑ ݖ ൑ ݖ௠௔௫
  
where ܽ ൌ 1/ ቀെ ఋఉ ߤଶ െ ߨߠଶቁ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଵ െ ߨߠଵቁ. The distribution is: 
 ܪ෩ሺݖሻ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ௔ଶ ൫ݖ െ ݖ௠௜௡൯
ଶ                                                                    if ݖ௠௜௡ ൑ ݖ ൑ ݖҧ
௔
ଶ ൫ݖҧ െ ݖ௠௜௡൯
ଶ ൅ ܽ൫ݖҧ െ ݖ௠௜௡൯ሺݖ െ ݖҧሻ                   if ݖҧ ൑ ݖ ൑ ݖҧҧ
௔
ଶ ൫ݖҧ െ ݖ௠௜௡൯
ଶ ൅ ܽ൫ݖҧ െ ݖ௠௜௡൯ሺݖ െ ݖҧሻ െ ௔ଶ ሺݖ െ ݖҧҧሻଶ   if ݖҧҧ ൑ ݖ ൑ ݖ௠௔௫
 
 
                                                            
18 In the equations that follow the density and distribution of z has not been multiplied by the uniform density of 
the underlying distribution of the k’s. This simplifies the notation, while nothing essential is missing. 
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The allocation rule can now be written as: ݕሺݖሻ ൌ ܩିଵ ቀܩሺݕכሻ ൅ ܪ෩ሺݖሻቁ. Like before 
we assume that the income distribution is uniform. This implies: ݕሺݖሻ ൌ ݕכ ൅ ܪ෩ሺݖሻ൫ݕ௠௔௫ െ
ݕ௠௜௡ሻ. The differential equation we have to solve follows from (9) when we substitute the 
allocation function for y: 
 డ௙డ௭ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚߨߠ଴ െ ߚݖ ൅ ߛ ቀݕכ ൅ ܪ෩ሺݖሻ൫ݕ௠௔௫ െ ݕ௠௜௡൯ െ ݂ሺݖሻቁ   
We have to solve this equation for the density function ܪ෩ሺݖሻ that we derived above. Clearly, 
there are 3 regimes with different solutions. We solve the three corresponding differential 
equations. We have an initial condition for the first regime that follows from the public 
transport alternative and is analogous to the one we discussed in the cases of single 
dimensional quality. The initial condition for the solution of the second regime is simply the 
value of the solution for the first regime if ݖ ൌ ݖҧ. And similar for the third regime. 
Figure A2 shows the density and distribution of z for fuel prices equal to €1.5 and 
€1.8. The higher fuel price causes a decrease in the value of z for all car makes. As a result, 
the density and the distribution both shift to the left, implying a lower experienced utility of 
the cars. Note that the distribution of z is not affected by a kilometer charge. 
What happens if the fuel price increases while the fixed cost function remains 
unchanged? We investigated this question in section 3 for the cases with one-dimensional 
quality. To find the answer to this question in the present two-dimensional case, we return to 
the first order conditions (12). We recall that the fixed cost function can be written as a 
function of z, and that the first derivatives with respect to quality aspect m can therefore be 
written as: ௗ௙ௗ௠ ൌ
ௗ௙
ௗ௭
ௗ௭
ௗ௠, (and analogously for k) for the original fixed cost function. For the 
right-hand sides of (12) the new fuel price is relevant. We use superfixes 0 and 1 to 
distinguish between the original and new fuel prices, respectively. An interior optimum 
requires: 
 ௗ௙ௗ௭ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଵ െ ߨ଴ߠଵቁ ൌ ݍௌோ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଵ െ ߨଵߠଵቁ,     (A1a) 
 ௗ௙ௗ௭ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଶ െ ߨ଴ߠଶቁ ൌ ݍௌோ ቀെ
ఋ
ఉ ߤଶ െ ߨଵߠଶቁ.     (A1b) 
However, these two equations are in general incompatible as can easily be verified by taking 
their ratio: 
 
ቀିഃഁఓభିగబఏభቁ
ቀିഃഁఓమିగబఏమቁ
് ቀି
ഃ
ഁఓభିగభఏభቁ
ቀିഃഁఓమିగభఏమቁ
 . 
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This means that consumers will in general attempt to move to one of the boundaries of 
the support of (m,k). Starting from an equilibrium, an increase in the fuel price will imply that 
the left-hand side of (15a) will become smaller than the right-hand side, whereas the opposite 
will happen with (15b). The consumer will therefore decrease the value of the first quality 
aspect and increase the second (for instance by moving to a smaller and newer car), but this 
will not restore the equilibrium as long as the combination considered is in the interior of the 
support because the ratio of the two left-hand sides does not become equal to that of the right 
hand side. Only one condition can be satisfied, and this means that the optimum can only be a 
corner solution. 
The consequence of a higher fuel price will therefore be that the demand of all 
consumers who still want to own a car shifts to cars with either a maximum value of k or a 
minimum value of m. We therefore conclude that in the model with two-dimensional quality a 
change in the fuel price causes a dramatic shift in demand. A change in the fixed cost function 
is necessary to restore the market equilibrium. 
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a) Density of z 
 
b) Distribution of z 
Figure A2 Density and distribution of z with high and low fuel price 
 
The new fixed cost function can be written as a function of z as it is defined on the 
basis of the new fuel price. Apart from a shift in demand by the consumers who want to keep 
a car (although usually of a different quality), there will be consumers who decide not to own 
a car anymore.  
 The consequences of the introduction of a kilometer charge are less drastic. The 
equilibrium needs only to adapt to the lower demand for kilometers which means that less of 
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both qualities will be demanded. And also in this case, some consumers will decide not to 
own a car anymore.     
Adjustment in the fixed cost function 
We again use the extended model to study the effects of an increase in the fuel price 
from €1.5 to €1.8. We kept the same values for most of the parameters; those that are different 
are given in Table A3.1 below. Quality aspect m increases variable cost and has the largest 
weight in the quality index. Since most quality aspects one can think of (engine power, cabin 
space, safety) tend to increase fuel use per km, this seems plausible. In comparison with the 
previous section we have also decreased the value of the parameter ߠଶ. This also intends to 
reflect reality in which we don’t observe a trade-off between fixed and variable costs of 
otherwise identical cars (see Mulalic and Rouwendal, 2011). Also in recent years new cars 
hardly seem more fuel efficient  than older ones. Note, however, that the fuel saving quality 
aspect now does have a direct impact on utility via the weight ߤଶ. We noted earlier that this 
can either be interpreted as ‘green’ preferences or as a taste for newness of cars. 
 
Table A3.1. Numerical values for the simulations with two-dimensional quality 
Parameter Interpretation Numerical value 
ߤଵ Weight of quality aspect k  0.25 
ߤଶ Weight of quality aspect m 0.75 
   
ߠ଴ Intercept of fuel use function 0.15 
ߠଵଵ Sensitivity of fuel use for k -0.0015 
ߠଵଶ Sensitivity of fuel use for m 0.01 
    
݇ଵ௠௔௫ Maximum quality k 10 
݇ଵ௠௜௡ Minimum quality k 0 ݇ଶ௠௔௫ Maximum quality m 10 
݇ଶ௠௜௡ Minimum quality m 0 
The values of the other parameters are the same as in Table 1.  
 
 The fixed cost function in the initial situation and the changes in fixed costs that bring 
the market back to equilibrium after an increase in the fuel price or the introduction of a 
kilometer charge are shown in Figure A3.1. All three diagrams have fuel using quality k on 
the horizontal axis and fuel saving technology m on the backward moving axis. The first 
diagram has the fixed cost on the vertical axis, the other two the change in fixed cost.  
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a) The original fixed cost function 
 
b) Impact of an increase in the fuel price 
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c) Impact of a kilometer charge  
Figure A3.1. The equilibrium fixed cost function and the impact of tax changes  
 
Diagram a) shows that the impact of fuel spending technology on fixed cost is much larger 
than that of fuel saving technology, which is no surprise given their impact on variable cost. 
Diagram b) shows that for low values of fuel spending quality, the decrease in fixed cost is 
smaller for more fuel efficient cars, whereas the converse is true if there is a high level of fuel 
spending quality. The decrease in fixed costs is always larger when fuel spending quality is 
larger. 
Table A3.2 presents the average effects for the average driver.  
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Table A3.2. Implications for the average driver: two quality aspects    
 Reference Increase in fuel price Kilometer charge 
Kilometrage 15,231 14,719 14,879 
Price per km 0.1875 0.225 0.225 
Fuel use per km 0.125 0.125 0.125 
Total fuel use 1,768 1,697 1,724 
Total var. cost 2,652 3,054 3,144 
Fixed cost 5,880 5,441 5,385 
Total car cost 8,531 8,495 8,529 
Comp var ex ante  -518 -569 
Comp var ex post  -79 -74 
Note: all figures refer to average effects per car/household. 
 
